/usr/man/cat.3/CMS_get0_signers.3(/usr/man/cat.3/CMS_get0_signers.3)
CMS_verify(3) OpenSSL CMS_verify(3)
NAME
CMS_verify, CMS_get0_signers - verify a CMS SignedData
structure
SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/cms.h>
int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
DESCRIPTION
CMS_verify() verifies a CMS SignedData structure. cms is the
CMS_ContentInfo structure to verify. certs is a set of
certificates in which to search for the signing
certificate(s). store is a trusted certificate store used
for chain verification. indata is the detached content if
the content is not present in cms. The content is written to
out if it is not NULL.
flags is an optional set of flags, which can be used to
modify the verify operation.
CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from
cms, it must be called after a successful CMS_verify()
operation.
VERIFY PROCESS
Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.
Initially some sanity checks are performed on cms. The type
of cms must be SignedData. There must be at least one
signature on the data and if the content is detached indata
cannot be NULL.
An attempt is made to locate all the signing certificate(s),
first looking in the certs parameter (if it is not NULL) and
then looking in any certificates contained in the cms
structure itself. If any signing certificate cannot be
located the operation fails.
Each signing certificate is chain verified using the
smimesign purpose and the supplied trusted certificate
store. Any internal certificates in the message are used as
untrusted CAs. If CRL checking is enabled in store any
internal CRLs are used in addition to attempting to look
them up in store. If any chain verify fails an error code is
returned.
Finally the signed content is read (and written to out is it
is not NULL) and the signature's checked.
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CMS_verify(3) OpenSSL CMS_verify(3)
If all signature's verify correctly then the function is
successful.
Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in
the flags parameter to change the default verify behaviour.
If CMS_NOINTERN is set the certificates in the message
itself are not searched when locating the signing
certificate(s). This means that all the signing certificates
must be in the certs parameter.
If CMS_NOCRL is set and CRL checking is enabled in store
then any CRLs in the message itself are ignored.
If the CMS_TEXT flag is set MIME headers for type text/plain
are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type
text/plain then an error is returned.
If CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY is set the signing certificates
are not verified.
If CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY is set the signed attributes signature
is not verified.
If CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY is set then the content digest is
not checked.
NOTES
One application of CMS_NOINTERN is to only accept messages
signed by a small number of certificates. The acceptable
certificates would be passed in the certs parameter. In this
case if the signer is not one of the certificates supplied
in certs then the verify will fail because the signer cannot
be found.
In some cases the standard techniques for looking up and
validating certificates are not appropriate: for example an
application may wish to lookup certificates in a database or
perform customised verification. This can be achieved by
setting and verifying the signers certificates manually
using the signed data utility functions.
Care should be taken when modifying the default verify
behaviour, for example setting CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY will
totally disable all content verification and any modified
content will be considered valid. This combination is
however useful if one merely wishes to write the content to
out and its validity is not considered important.
Chain verification should arguably be performed using the
signing time rather than the current time. However since the
signing time is supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted
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CMS_verify(3) OpenSSL CMS_verify(3)
without additional evidence (such as a trusted timestamp).
RETURN VALUES
CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and
zero if an error occurred.
CMS_get0_signers() returns all signers or NULL if an error
occurred.
The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
BUGS
The trusted certificate store is not searched for the
signing certificate, this is primarily due to the
inadequacies of the current X509_STORE functionality.
The lack of single pass processing means that the signed
content must all be held in memory if it is not detached.
SEE ALSO
ERR_get_error(3), CMS_sign(3)
HISTORY
CMS_verify() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8
1.0.2t Last change: 2019-09-10 3
See also CMS_verify(3)
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